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tional context in which they operated. . Economic development strategies are not
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between neoclassical and "statist" positions on policy process. Some mechanisms of insulation
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provide an example of an institutional approach instinctive tendency to exploit rent-seeking
to economic development that is relevant for opportunities.
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Two basic positions have framed recent debates about South Korea's remarka-
ble economic growth. The neoclassical position traces South Korea's take off to a
set of policy reforms in 1964 and 1965 that launched the country on the path toward
export-led growth (Frank, Kim and Westphal, 1975; Kuznets 1977; Krueger, 1979).
Policy was far from laissez-faire, but on the whole, the reforms moved Korea in
a more market-oriented direction that sought to exploit Korea's comparative advan-
tage. The "statists," by contrast, have detailed the pervasive intervention of the
Korean government in the economy, even after the shift toward an outward-oriented
strategy. Moreover, they have argued that such intervention promoted rapid econom-
ic growth (Leudde-Neurath, 1985; Jones and Sakong, 1980; Amsden, 1989).
This study addresses this debate by examining the transition from a strategy
of import-substitution that characterized Korea's growth in the 1950s to a strategy
of export-oriented industrialization. An analysis of policy change demands closer
attention to factors ignored in the economic debate, particularly the incentives
facing political and economic actors and the institutional context within which they
operate. We make three sets of arguments, the first concerning the political
system as a whole. In the 1950s, the financial weakness of the ruling Liberal
Party and its declining political fortunes made it rational for Syngman Rhee to
maximize his dependence on aid, limit the domain of coherent planning and maintain
discretionary control over a variety of policy instruments in order to build political
support. This contributed to incoherent economic policy.
Park Chung Hee also used economic instruments for political ends. Three
conditions had changed by the early 1960s, however, one external, two internal.
First, American pressure intensified under the Kennedy administration, and aid was
used more effectively to press for policy reform. Second, Park was more suscep-
tible to American pressure because of the very emphasis he had given to economic
development il legitimating military intervention. Finally, Park had the capacity to
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act decisively. With the concentration of power in the hands of the executive
during the pei ,d of military rule, the old networks that constituted the political
foundations of ISI were broken.
A second set of arguments concerns the relationship between political elites
and technocrats. During the 1950s, the economic bureaucracy was "dualistic"
(Haggard, 1990). A small cadre of technocrats advanced a reform agenda, but they
occupied a peripheral role in the policy system. The military launched a series of
institutional reforms aimed at enhancing the government's ability to plan and imple-
ment economic policy: a purge and reform of the civil service; the seizure of new
policy instruments; and the centralization of economic decision-making. These
institutional changes outlasted the military interregnum, and contributed to the
coherence of subsequent policy.
Third, we seek to address the debate between the neoclassical and statist
positions more directly by examining the nature of the government intervention that
accompanied South Korea's turn to an export-oriented strategy. Two sets of mutu-
ally supportive reforms can be distinguished. The first was the macroeconomic
and incentive reforms that have received wide attention from economists. The
second set of reforms, however, drew on a more activist conception of the state's
role and probably from an awareness of Japanese industrial policy. This side of
the export-promotion program included heavily subsidized credit protection and a
variety of institutional supports to exporters.
Why should these interventions be important if South Korea managed, on bal-
ance, to "get the prices right"? The answer lies, first, in the costs for firms in
moving to an export-oriented strategy. Under an import-substituting regime, firms
are unaware of their potential competitiveness. Where price signals have been
distorted by import-substituting policies, providing subsidies to export can be effi-
2
cient in inducing firms to recognize their advantages.
A second reason for intervention centers on the credibility of government
policy. If firms perceive that a new policy orientation is not likely to
receive sustained governmental support, then they are unlikely to reorient
production even if incentives favor it in the short-run (Rodrik, 1990). A
number of government actions can be interpreted as institutional investments
designed to signal governmental commitment. These two objectives--easing the
transition to world markets for local firms and signaling government
intentions--help account for the interventionist style of Korea's export drive.
The remainder of the study is divided into five sections. In the first section,
we examine the politics of development under the Syngman Rhee government. The
second section examines the short-lived Second Republic. Though Korea's take-off
is generally traced to the early 1960s, this history is important since it provides
telling evidence for the importance of political institutions in launching and sustain-
ing growth-oriented pulicies. In the third section, we examine the period of mili-
tary rule from the "revolution" of May 16, 1961 through the return to nominally
civilian rule under Park in 1964, a pel -od of dramatic political and institutional
change. In the fourth section, we examine the economic reforms of the first three
years of Park's first presidency. The conclusion extracts several lessons of
broader comparative relevance.
I. THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF IMPORT-SUBSTITUTION: 1954-1960
The significance of U.S. support for the Rhee government can hardly be
overstated. Aid financed nearly 70% of total imports between 1953 and 1%1 and
75% of total fixed capital formation (Cole, 1980; Pu, 1961). From South Korea's
independeiice in 1948, the United States sought to link its foreign assistance to
close monitoring of foreign exchange, sound fiscal and monetary policies and the
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privatiz&tir i of Japanese properties.
Aid conflicts also re. ected more basic differences over reeonstruction and
development strategy, not only between the Koreans and Americans, but among
foreign advisors as well. Two emphases coexisted in the U.S. aid program: cne
that priority be given to stabilization, the other more developmentalist. The Amei -
can-dominated U.N. Command was highly skeptical of Korea's economic potential
and was primarily concerned with buttressing Korea's military position, rather than
its economic self-sufficiency (Lyons, 1J61). The American military placed particu-
lar emphasis on stabilization, arguing strenuously about the dangers of credit expan-
sion and new investment. An economic advisory team to United Nations Korean
Reconstruction Agency (UNKRA) represented a more developmentalist approach that
was critical of the emphasis given to stabilization (Lewis, 1955). This group
argued for a rationalized program cf infrastructural development and import-substi-
tution that would make Korea "self-sufficient" in five years, financed by large
infusions of development assistance and greatly e-.panded mineral and agricultural
exports.
Rhee's economic thinking was far from coherent, but he certainly cared less
about inflation than the Americans (Park, 1967:11-13). The U.S. strategy seemed
to neglect investment in new plant and equipment and offer a return to the export-
oriented economy of the Japanese occupation (Chu, 1962; Lim, 1967:168-9). This
fear was compounded by sustained American pressure to normalize economic rela-
tions with Tokyo, pressure that Rhee successfully resisted.
The United States took over the responsibility for Korea's reconstruction from
the multilateral agencies in 1953. Eisenhower's call for an additional $200 million
for Korean reconstruction was tied to the effort to overcome Rhee's vehement
opposition to the signing of an armistice (Chu, 1962:82-90; Eisenhower, 1953). Th
new U.S. aid commitment did not mark the end of political conflict between dono
4
Und client. .Rhee complained publicly about the slowness of aid deliveries, the lack
of attention to new investment and the emphasis given to commodity imports, which
accounted for about three-quarters of uil aid between 1953 and 1960. One half of
this was agricultural commodities, with the rest going primarily to fertilizer and
petroleum products. Of the remaining project-related aid, only 16.5% went directly
to manufacturing. Nonetheless, the significance of U.S. aid to industrial develop-
ment is greater than the figures suggest, since imported commodities, including
foodstuffs, were distributed to local industry for processing and became the basis
for the development of a number of important Korean firms (McNamara, 1990).
Despite the common picture of sluggish growth under the import-substitution regime,
industry did quite well, albeit from a low base. GDP growth averaged 3.9% from
1953-55 to 1960-62, but this can be traced largely to the poor performance of
agriculture and services. Industry grew at 11.2% a year (Cole and Lyman,
1971:192-193).
During the war, exchange rate policies continued to be the central point of
contention. Between 1953 and 1960, Korea saw a bewildering succession of ex-
change rate regimes. None lasted for two full years; all r?- 'ervalued the dollar
(Frank, Kim and Westphal, 1975). Following acrimonious negotiations, the U.S.
succeeded in getting the Korean government to devalue in December 1953 and to
commit itself to a broader reform effort. When Rhee visited Washington in July
1954, the U.S. outlined the economic and political quid-pro-quo for assistance.
Rhee would agree to:
1. Recognize the authority of the United Nations Command over the Korean
armed forces, a move deemed necessary to hold Rhee in check;
2. Accept ceilings on the size of the Korean armed forces, which were seen
as a drain on both the U.S. and Korean budgets;
3. Privatize state-owned properties and encourage private investment;
4. Utilize aid funds in compliance with U.S. laws and regulations and notify
the U.S. of how foreign exchange was being used;
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5. Maintain a realistic exchange rate;
6. Import aid commodities from those non-Communist areas where the lowest
prices were offered, in effect, a demand that economic relations with Japan be
normalized;
7. Establish a system that would raise the money for won advances to U.N.
forces through public auction, rather than through loans that would be repaid at set
exchange rates (FRUS, 1954).
Despite the agreement, U.S. aid coordinator E. Tyler Wood was subjected to a
tirade from Rhee in September 1954 on the need to maintain a fixed rate in order
to avoid inflation and restore confidence (Wood, 1953). Rhee threatened that if the
U.S. did not agree, he would revert to an even more overvalued rate. As Wood
recognized, the issue was whether the U.S. would rely on good faith from Rhee
conceruing reform measures, or stand firm by demanding compliance on a strict
quid-pro-quo basis.
An agreement was reached in 1955 on the conditions under which devaluation
would be required, but U.S. policy gradually shifted beginning in 1956 from a focus
on the exchange rate to the root cause of the imbalance in domestic inflation. In
1956, Rhee ordered that a Financial Stabilization Program be elaborated (Lim,
1965:168-169). The Ministry of Finance worked closely with advisors to the U.S.
aid mission in developing the program, and others followed each year. The stabili-
zation programs were successful at slowing inflation, but the positive effects on
investment and development were not forthcoming. GNP growth peaked at 7.7% in
1957, declined to 5.2% in 1958, 3.9% in 1959 and 1.9% in 1960.
The standard interpretation of this slowdown was that it refltcted the growing
inefficiency and exhaustion of import-substitution. This is no doubt true, but as a
World Bank assessment noted, the stabilization programs contributed to the slow-
down in growth, particularly as they corresponded with a decline in American aid
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(World Bank, 1964:4-5). But even more importantly, the stabilization program
could not address the underlying political structure that was distorting the allocation
of resources and hampering a more rational plannmng process. Policies thevt ap-
peared a complex and confusing patchwork from an economic perspective can be
explained by Rhee's use of the instruments of economic :>Aicy--allocation of foreign
exchange, bank credit, import licenses, and the distributio'.; of state-owned enter-
prises--to sustain and build a base of support.
As soon as the war ended, Rhee began to face more intense political competi-
tion. New opposition parties formed. Rhee ran unopposed in 1956 because of the
sudden death of his major opponent. Nonetheless, he managed to capture only 55%
of the popular vote, down from 72% in 1952, and his vice presidential candidate was
defeated. Most observers of Korean politics note a shift in the style of leadership
in a more autocratic and defensive direction during the late fifties (Palais, 1973;
Henderson, 1968). "Hardliners" within the party and the administration gained at
the expense of those favoring technocratic solutions and greater emphasis on eco-
nomic development. One obvious way of mobilizing funds to finance elections an-'
other party activities was to forge a closer alliance with portions of the private
sector. A new group of businessmen arose in the post-World War II period
through commerce or the acquisition of state-owned enterprises. As these firms
diversified beyond their commercial activities lato manufacturing they sought gov-
ernment support. The grant of various privileges generated rents that could be
recycled back to government officials, to the party and to individual legislators
(Kim, 1964; Park, 1982; McNamara, 1990).
It is impossible to get an aggregate estimate of the size or composition
of what might be called the rent-seeking sector. Evidence from a variety of
sources, including evaluations of the aid program by the U.S., those scandals
and incidents that became political issues during the 1950s and those that were
later exposed during investigations launched by the military government suggest that
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corruption was widespread (GAO, 1962; Hakminsa, 1985; Meade, 1951:203-212; Lee,
301-2 1985; Park, 1982; U.S. Embassy [Seoul], 1954; McNamara, 1990).
The greatest opportunities were provided by the overvalued exchange rate,
which was linked to a complex licensing system for imports. U.S. criticism of the
exchange rate and trade regimes was usually couche, in terms of the need to
encourage the productive and efficient use of resour'es, but clearly r'flected a
concern with corruption. A GAO report noted that "laxity" by the Bank of Korea
in the allocation of aid dollars to importers encouraged speculation and led to collu-
sion between supplier and importer, shipment of defective merchandise, kickbacks
and overpricing (GAO, 1962:98-143).
Trade policy was closely tied with access to foreign exchange. As the U.S.
sought greater "self-sufficiency," doubts were raised about the policy of financing
consumer goods imports. In 1957, an amendment. io the tariff law paved the way
for a somewhat more systematic pursuit of ISI (KOMF, 1978:78-81). Tariffs
were lowered on capital goods and raw materials and higher tariffs were imposed
on locally manufactured goods and on finished and semi-finished goods. This
provided new opportunLities for profit in a range of processing industries, including
the famous "three whites," sugar, cotton yarn, and wheat flour, which had liberal
access to PL480 shipments. For example, wheat was provided virtually free of
duty to millers through PL480. The cost of producing a sack of wheat flour was
estimated at 350 hwan, but domestic manufacturers were able to charge 1,200 hwan
per sack, and shortages sometimes drove price: o 5,000 hwan (Kim, 1965:27-30).
Another controversial element of economic management under the Rhee regime
was the allocation of bank loans. In the 1950s, capital was scarce and inflation
relatively high, but interest rates reflected a policy of financial repression.
Government ceilings on loan rates meant windfalls for those firms gaining access
to finance, who then paid "commissions" for their privilege. Privatization of
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state-owned enterprises and banks and gove, nment contract,irg provided additional
opportunities fcr the ruling party. Not limiting itself to kickbacks, the Liberal
Party was estimated to have interests in twenty-nine projects and the party was
believed to have had a substantial interest in at least 50 percent of all -f the pri-
vate projects receiving American aid in 1960 (Kim, 1975:152).
These examples of the political use of economic instruments suggest why
bureaucrats had an extremely low level of autonomy from outside pressures. Bruce
Cumings (1981:151-158) has shown how the bureaucracy and the former colonial
bureaucrats who staffed it were an important base of Rhee's political power in the
early period of independence. Wider evidence confirms that higher civil servants
were recruited on a political basis with only perfunctory screening (Pak, 1961;
Song, 1960; Yi, 1966). In 1960, only 1.3% of bureau directors (Grade 2) and 4.6%
of administrators (Grade 3B) were recruited by examination. A detailed study of
U.S. efforts to expo.t meritocratic norms cokicludes that it "was difficult to find
any effect Gi the American effort on the personnel system in Korea" (Bark,
1967: 2`-222).
The aggregate picture demands some modification, however, since portions of
the bureaucracy were open to foreign models, innovation and planning. The bu-
reaucracy might be described as "dualistic," with competing centers of political and
technocratic rationality coexisting in one administrative structu.-e. The innovations
that did occur provided the bureaucratic raw material from which later institutional
developments were forged (Lee, 1968:ch. 8). In 1955, Rhee established the Ministry
of Reconstruction (MOR). The MOR was involved in the coordination of the annual
stabilization plans with the American aid mission through the revived Combined
Economic Board. An Economic Development Council (EDC) was formed in March
1958 as a consulting and research agency for the Ministry of Reconstruction, fi-
nanced partly by counterpart funds. As a new ministry with no set constituency,
the MOR developed a significant cadre of trained administrators w}o were relative-
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ly insulated from Liberal Party pressures. The Bureau of the Budget within the
Ministry of Finance was also an island of innovation, urging reforms of the budge-
tary process.
In April 1959, the EDC economists drafted a Three Year Plan which was to
be the foundation for later planning efforts. The plan spurred reforms in the
government's sVatistical capabilities and became an important educational device for
all those immediately concerned. The fate of these reforin efforts, and particular-
ly the Three Year Plan. was decided by politics both within and outside the bu-
reaucracy The semi-independent status of the EDC, the growth of MOR and the
plans of the reformers encountered stiff bureaucratic resistance. More important-
ly, the economic bureaucracy as a whole had little autonomy from pressures ema-
nating from the Part), the private sector and the executive itself. The Liberal
Party had a powerful say in personnel administration, leading to frequent changes at
the ministerial level (Table 1).
Table 1
Turnover Among Economic Cabinet Ministers, 1948-1960
Ministry Number of Ministers Average Term
---------------------------------------------------------------- __-----------_
Agriculture 16 9 months
Commerce 11 13 months
Finance 9 14 months
Reconstruction 4 13 months
------------------------------------------------------------------- __--------
(Source: Calculated from Frank M. Landers, Technical Assistance in Public
Administration: USOM/Korea, 1955-1967 [Seoul: USOM/Korea, 19671, p. 60).
Conditions only worsened as the political situation deteriorated in the late
1950s. Preoccupied with political problems, Rhee reviewed the Three Year Plan
only twice during the two year period of its formulation. The Liberal Party
shelved the final draft of the plan for a year in 1959, approving it only a few days
before the student revolution that ended Liberal Party rule.
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In sum, Korea in the 1950s exhibited political characteristics which were
clearly inimical to development planning. The government was poorly insulated
from the demands of the private sector and was penetrated by patron-client net-
works, while the economic bureaucracy was subject to political interference from
both the executive and the ruling party. The last years of the Rhee administration
were a period of some innovation within the economic bureaucracy, but these inno-
vations took place in a larger political context that blocked reform.
II.THE SECOND REPUBLIC: APRIL 1960-MAY 1_1
The short-lived Second Republic suggests the critical importance of the
larger political context for development planning efforts. The Second Republic was
launched following a series of demonstrations against the Rhee government that
culminated in the "student revolution" in April and Rhee's resignation (Han, 1974;
Kim, 1983). The opposition Democratic Party came to power in July, replacing an
interim government. Economic development and the elimination of corruption were
the top political priorities of the new administration. The new government contin-
ued to seek aid, but took a number of initiatives including a devaluation of the
exchange rate in February 1961, the rationalization of public enterprises and in
general, the move toward a more market-oriented economy (Eisenhower, 1960).
High-level support was also given to new planning efforts. In November, the
Ministry of Reconstruction was instructed to draft a new five year development
plan that would improve upon and supersede previous efforts.
Most importantly, work was begun on restructuring the economic bureaucracy
itself. Reformers were given new opportunities to advance their ideas on institu-
tional reform. Through a Working-Level Interministerial Council for Reorganizing
Government, the reformers pieced together an intra-bureaucratic coalition in favor
of centralization of key planning and policy functions. In early May 1961, they
proposed the creation of a "super ministry," later to become the Economic Planning
1 1
Board. The key innovation, taken from the Indian Planning Commission, was to
combine planning powers with control over the budget and inflows of foreign capi-
tal. The new ministry was to be built around the planning offices of MOR and
EDC, but was also to absorb the Bureau of the Budget and control over the alloca-
tion of aid funds that had been with the Ministry of Finance. The plan was un-
veiled days before the military government took power.
If public statements by Chang Myon and internal bureaucratic alignments
seemed to be moving toward reform, the larger political context was much less
favorable. Part of the political problem lay with short-term economic policies and
conditions, including devaluation, an increase in rates for government-subsidized
services and food shortages. Economic problems were not the only difficulties
facing the new regime, however. The Democratic Party was a loose coalition of
anti-Rhee politicians (Han, 1974). Many saw the ascent to power as the opportunity
to exploit the patronage benefits of office so long denied them. Members of the
ruling party quickly moved into positions in public enterprises and the bureaucracy.
Chang Myon also suffered broader political weaknesses. He had been selected as
prime minister only after a factional struggle that ultimately split the party.
Reform of the military, purge of corrupt officials, confiscation of illicitly accumu-
lated wealth and unification with the North gained the attention of intellectuals and
students and became highly divisive issues. Labor, including teachers and bank
employees, also took advantage of the political opening to organize and press their
demands. Lacking any independence, even from its own supporters, the government
was unable to reconcile the conflicting demands placed on it from left and right,
and finally proved incapable of maintaining order.
III.MILITARY INTERREGNUM: MAY 1%1-DECEMBER 1964
The differences between the Rhee and Chang Myon governments on the one
hand and the military and post-military governments on the other provide crucial
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insights into the institutional foundations of Korea's rapid economic growth. The
military coup of May 16, 1961 had three consequences for the Korean political
system. First, the military broke the political networks of the Rhee period by
centralizing power in the executive. Even after the transition to a nominally
democratic system in 1964, the new political structure resulted in a high degree of
independence from the demands of interest groups. This is visible in a second
major change; the restructuring of business-state relations. A new alliance with
the private sector was forged over the early sixties, but one in which the opportu-
nities for rent-seeking were reduced. Finally, the centralization of political au-
thority was matched by a centralization of economic decision-making in the Econom-
ic Planning Board. These reforms increased the power of reformist technocrats
by elevating their stature within the bureaucracy and by expanding the range of
policy instruments at their disposal.
Rest_cturin Politics
The military justified its intervention in politics by reference to the tasks of
economic development; as Park wrote in 1962, "the key factor of the May 16 Mili-
tary Revolution was to effect an industrial revolution in Korea" (Park, 1970:175).
The economic policies of the junta were initially driven by short-term political
concerns rather than a coherent strategy, however. The early actions of the mili-
tary government had a strong puritanical and anti-urban tone that reflected the rural
origins of the coup leaders (Cole and Lyman, 1971:274). The younger colonels of
the 8th class of the Korean Military Academy saw themselves as progressives,
advancing the same reformist causes as the April student revolution (Kim, 1971).
With weak ties to the dominant elite, the military had few reservations about re-
structuring politics. Following the coup on May 16th and the declaration of martial
law, all political parties and organizations and unions were banned and the press
subjected to censorship. A Revolutionary Court and Prosecution was established in
13
July to try those accused of various crimes, including the illicit accumulation of
wealth and corruption. In the spring of 1962, 4,369 politicians and government
officials were forbidden to participate in politics unless undergoing a screening by
the military, a process that cleared all but 74 politicians. The 74 included, howev-
er, top leaders of the Democratic Party and other progressives. The bureaucracy
and military were not immune from the drive for "purification." In July, 2,000
officers were retired, including 40 generals. One of the first tasks of the newly
formed Korean Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA) was the screening of 41,000
government employees, 1,863 of which were found to have been involved in corrup-
tion and "anti-revolutionary" activities (Gunsa Hyuckmyung Pyunchanwiwonhoi,
1963).
The actual consolidation of political authority proved circuitous because of
deep splits within the military itself. In August 1961, Park promised a return to
civilian government in May 1963. Hoping to capitalize on the opposition's disarray,
the junta announced an early election. Park accepted the nomination of the Demo-
cratic Republican Party (DRP), which had been organized by Kim Jong-pil, a key
member of the coup group, head of the KCIA and Park Chung Hee's nephew-in-law.
The decision to return to a formally democratic political structure brought the
factional splits within the Supreme Council for National Reconstruction (SCNR), the
body of coup leaders, into the open. The younger officers, some influenced by
socialist ideas, wanted an extension of military rule to carry out a wide-ranging
transformation of society and economy. When Park sought to heal the split within
the military by announcing he would postpone the elections and hold a referendum on
continued military rule, he precipitated a broader political crisis and strong protests
from Washington. Park relentted on the referendum. Even with a fragmented and
politically tainted opposition, Park won only a narrow victory amidst charges of
election fraud
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Despite the return to democratic forms in January 1964, the new constitution
designed by the military and its advisers greatly strengthened the power of the
executive (Oh, 1968:157-164). First, the constitution returned to the presidential
system, with a weak, unicamaral legislature (Kim and Pai, 1981:ch. 1). The
President had complete say in the appointment of the Cabinet, including the Prime
Minister, and great influence both formal and informal over the judiciary. The
President also enjoyed a range of emergency powers that included the ability to
constitutionally restrict freedom of the press, assembly and speech. This struc-
ture, and a stringent Political Party Law that placed various restrictions on politi-
cal activity, tended to weaken not only the legislature but all political parties,
including even the ruling party (Kihl and Kim, 1976). Once ensconced, Park skill-
fully used the powers of incumbency for building new networks of political support
around the presidency.
It should be added that Park himself drew a close link between a centralized
political system and the tasks of economic development. The following is but one
example of a theme that Park sounded throughout his political career:
In order to ensure efforts to improve the living conditions of the
people in Asia even undemocratic measures may be necessary.. .It
is also an undeniable fact that the people of Asia today fear
starvation and poverty more than the oppressive duties thrust on
them by totalitarianism...In other words, the Asian peoples want
to obtain economic equality first and build a more equitable polit-
ical machinery afterward (Park, 1971:39-40).
Restructurin Business-State Relations
The link between state power and development strategy is most visible in the
restructuring of state-business relations (Lee, 1985; Park, 1982; Kim, 1967). Two
weeks after the coup, thirteen major businessmen were arrested. Though eight of
these were induced to make large "contributions" to the government and were
released, the investigation was broadened to include another hundred and twenty
businessmen. The definition of "illicit" wealth covered the entire range of rent-
seeking and rent-granting activities that had been pervasive, if not unavoidable,
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under Rhee: illegal contributions to political funds; illicit purchase of vested
properties; profiteering from preferential access to government contracts and loans;
inisallocating foreign funds.
Though the government seized all outstanding shares of commercial bank
stocks, thus gaining control of a powerful policy instrument, they compromised with
large manufacturing and construction firms. In August 1961, the final decision of
the investigation committee demanded that thirty entrepreneurs refund an amount that
was much lower than the initial estimates of illegally accumulated wealth. The
reason for this shift in policy is summarized neatly by Kyong-dong Kim: "the only
viable economic force happened to be the target group of leading entrepreneurial
talents with their singular advantage of organization, persomel, facilities and capi-
tal resources" (Kim, 1967:470). In a recent interview, Kim Jong-pil, a leading
figure in the junta, outlined his own thinking at the time:
Pardoning the illicit wealth accumulators was an obvious violation
of the revolution's pledge to eliminate corruption and old evil
practices. But it was necessary...If we punished businessmen
under corruption charges, it was evident that our economy would
be paralyzed. Of course, members of the revolutionary council
insisted on prosecuting them, but I opposed it. It was essential to
coopt them in order to carry out revolutionary tasks. I personal-
ly persuaded General Park to release those arrested and to give
them new tasks. Moreover it was I who helped these business-
men form a new business organization, the Association of
Korean Businessmen, the predecessor of the Federation of Korean
Industries (Oh, 1986:339).
On their release, the members of the newly formed Association submitted a
plan to the Supreme Council identifying fourteen key industrial plants, including
cement, steel, and fertilizer in which they were interested in investing if the
appropriate supportive policies were forthcoming. The penalties imposed for the
illicit accumulation of wealth were to be invested in new plant, but these totalled
less than one sixth of the cost of the Association's plan (Lim, 1968). One of the
most important issues for the new business organization was easing access to
domestic and foreign credit. Government guarantee of foreign loans became a
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central feature ot government credit policy over the 1960s and 1970s.
The interpretation of the illegal wealth accumulation episode is the subject of
some controversy. Some accounts have stressed the continuity with past practice
and the fact that the military was forced to make peace with the private sector.
Politicians in the newly formed Democratic Republican Party were as dependent on
business contributions as Liberal Party politicians had been and the practice of
"political taxation" of the private sector by the executive was an open secret. . The
government's control of the banking system provided it a powerful tool with which
it could reward followers, and the question of preferential loans became a major
political controversy in 1964 and 1965, just as it had under Rhee (Dongah Ilbo,
February 18, 1965; Shin Dong Ah, 1965; Park, 1982:198-213; Kim and Park, 1968).
The thesis of continuity overlooks important changes in the nature of busi-
ness-government relations, however. First, as we argue below in more detail, the
economic reforms launched by the military significantly reduced the opportunities
for the directly unproductive profit-making activities that had existed under the
Rhee government. Devaluation benefited a wide range of small firms who turned to
export. While the government retained a high level of discretion over some policy
instruments, others, such as loans to exporters and access to imported inputs, were
extended to exporting firms on a non-discretionary basis. Second, even where
discretionary favors were extended to larger firms, they were generally tied to
some developmental purpose. Finally, the government had acquired greater control
over the instruments of economic policy than it had during the fifties.
Restructuring the Economic Bureaucracy
This expanded state capacity was the result, in turn, of changes in the eco-
nomic bureaucracy. Given that the group of coup-makers was relatively small, the
problem of how to administer the government rose immediately. The military's
approach was to use the existing governmental apparatus, but to superimpose on top
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of it the Supreme Council for National Reconstruction and to appoint military men
to key positions throughout the administrative structure. The change of government
provided an auspicious opening for reformers within the bureaucracy to push
forwa:-d their ideas concerning administrative restructuring. Within a week after
the coup, the reform group had submitted the plan that had already been developed
under the Chang Myon government. The Working Group's plans for an Economic
Plarning Board fit with the centralizing tendencies that accompanied the period of
military rule. As called for in the plan, the new ministry consisted of the budget
bureau, transferred from the Ministry of Finance, the statistics and research
bureau, moved from the Ministry of Home Affairs and the planning and coordination
offices from MOR.
From its initiation, the EPB came to have a powerful say over other minis-
tries through the budget. EPB's Bureau of Budget prepares the broad guidelines for
the annual budget, collects annual proposals from the other ministries and evaluates
their feasibility. EPB's power lies in its ability to designate specific projects for
which other ministries prepare the budgetary implications, and above all, its power
to adjust the budget estimates submitted by the ministries. A capital import bureau
was also established in l%1, and EPB's power extended to the area of foreign
borrowing. European investors refused to lend unless the government extended
guarantees on loan repayment. Seeing an opportunity to further expand EPB's
powers, the Bureau of International Cooperation, which oversaw aid relations and
was the dominant bureau throughout the early sixties, persuaded Park to establish
more extensive controls on the import of foreign capital. In July 1962, the minis-
try was given the power to extend government guarantees to loans and to audit and
oversee the activities of the borrowing firms. Finally, EPB was given the power
to select those capital goods imports and importers which qualified for government-
aided deferred payment privileges. When coupled with new laws that transferred
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the power to approve and extend incentives to foreign direct investment from the
Ministry of Finance to the EPB, the new ministry effectively gained complete
control over Korea's import of foreign capital. These laws naturally gave EPB a
strong say over the money supply and industrial policy as well. In 1963, the spe-
cial status of the EPB within the cabinet was further enhanced when its minister
was also given the title of Deputy Prime Minister.
In addition to consolidating the economic planning structure, the military also
launched a number of reforms designed to improve bureaucratic performance and
implementation. Three can be mentioned briefly. First, the military forged much
closer relations between the executive and the economic policy machinery. On
coming to power, the military demanded weekly briefings on the state of the
economy. The military had developed a standard briefing procedure, leading to the
joke that the country was run by the "ABCs": Army, briefings and charts. These
briefings provided an important channel of access for the technocrats, however, and
a way of influencing and educating the top military leaders. Second, the military
developed a system of "planning and control offices" (PCOs) as a way of monitor-
ing and evaluating perforn nce (Lee, 1968:144-145). A PCO was established within
EPB in July 1961 and the model was gradually extended to other ministries. Placed
under an Office of Planning Coordination in the Prime Minister's office, the PCOs
were required to monitor and evaluate the status of implementation of its projects
in quarterly reports, providing the Prime Minister, and ultimately the President, an
independent channel of information. Finally, under the guidance of the Minister of
Cabinet Administration, a series of reforms sought to rationalize the system of
personnel administration. Reforms included centralizing recruitment and selection,
improving examinations and installing a performance rating system.
Toward Policy Reform
The changes in the Korean political system under the military proved important
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for the adoptation and implementation of a coherent economic strategy, but they did
not in themselves constitute an economic program. Understanding the economic
reform demands exploring in closer detail the interests of three sets of actors: the
technocrats, the military and the United States.
Despite its formal powers, EPB initially faced problems similar to those of
the MOR under Rhee. On coming to power, the junta assigned the newly-forming
Economic Planning Board the task of drafting a new plan. The junta outlined a
series of quantitative objectives, including annual growth rates and targets for the
principal macroeconomic variables. These numbers were derived from the previous
plan, but artificially inflated to distinguish the new plan from its predecessor.
The overall philosophy of the plan was "a form of 'guided capitalism' in which the
principle of free enterprise and respect for the freedom and initiative of private
enterprise will be observed, but in whieh the government will either directly partic-
ipate in or indirectly render guidance to the basic industries and other important
fields" (Economic Planning Board, 1962:28). From the perspective of the planners,
however, a primary goal was to eliminate the range of controls that had permitted
the corruption and misallocation of resources of the Rhee period. The ambitious
plan targets and projections, for which the plan has been criticized, were secondary
to the effort to outline th.3 more general policy thrust. The plan is replete with
references linking state intervention not only to economic inefficiency and distor-
tions, but to corruption (EPB, 1962:27). Interestingly, the plan was extremely
cautious with reference to macroeconomic policy, despite the rather ambitious
growth targets--7.1% a year from 1962-1966--which had been imposed by the mili-
tary. Instead, the language at some points even seems to suggest some skepticism
about the plan targets imposed by the military:
While the plan implementation calls for procurement and supply of
enormous amounts of investment capital, pursuit of policies tending
to undermine financial stability in favor of excessive investment is
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bound to offset the beneficial effects of the Plan, and might even
lead to its complete failure. Therefore, in determining financial
and banking policy for the period, it is essential that the volume of
investment be maximized only within the f-amework of financial and
monetary stability" (EPB, 1962:35).
Not surprisingly, this conservative, market-oriented approach did not fit with
the immediate political interests of the military. While the SCNR pushed through
the organizational reforms of the economic bureaucracy and delegated planning tasks
to the new Economic Planning Board, they also set up an advisory board on econom-
ic questions that gave several populist economists access to the junta. These
economists, and some of their sympathizers among the colonels of the 8th class,
were critical not only of the corruption of the Rhee period, but of the dynamics of
a market system under which "the rich get richer, the poor get poorer."
A series of policy actions reflected this populist thrust (Brown,1973 :50-51).
The junta decreed the abolition of all "usurious" debts to farmers and fishermen,
guaranteed government repayment of those debts that were within legal interest rate
limits and moved to guarantee high and stable prices to farmers through subsidies.
Efforts were made to assist small and nmedium firms through the creation of the
Medium and Small Industry Bank. These policies were coupled with a highly
expansionist monetary policy--a 60% increase in the money supply in the military's
first year in office--and large budget deficits driven by the ambitious investment
demands of the plan and pay increases to public servants.
Pressure from the U.S.
The American attitude toward Korea during this period influenced both by
changing events in the country itself and by a broader reassessment of U.S. inter-
ests that took place under the Kennedy administration. The debate over Korean
policy began prior to the military coup, sparked by a long policy paper drafted in
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March 1961 (Farley, 1961). Claiming that Korea was a "sick society," the paper
argued that U.S. interests were being undermined by the weakness of the Chang
Myon government, the continuation of widespread corruption, but also fundamental
failures in the organization of the U.S. aid program. Arguing t.iat "we cannot sit
by and assume that Koreans must shape their own destiny" and that "the gradualist
approach to reform will not satisfy the needs of the country," presidential aids
pressed for a crash program that would be based on wide-ranging reforms (Ros-
tow, 1%1).
The U.S. signaled its displeasure at the intervention of the military. By June,
however, a Presidential Task Force on Korea advised for a strategy that included
establishing ties with the moderate elements of the regime and promoting self-
sustaining growth by encouraging the development of a coherent planning effort
(National Security Council, 1961). Particular attention would be given to policy
reforms that would undercut the opportunities for corruption: credit allocation;
budgeting; government contracting; taxes and interest rates were given as examples.
Support would also be extended for private efforts to encourage foreign direct
investment (Brubeck, 1962). The need to exert pressure to achieve reform was
explicitly recognized: "experience has shown the effectiveness of sanctions, based
upon withholding of inducements of economic aid, as a means of ensuring Korean
performance" (National Security Council, 1961).
By August 1961, cables from Seoul and internal documents showed a grudging
admiration of the ability of the military government to get things done (U.S.
Embassy, 1961). In addition, there were reasons to avoid undue pressure on the
government. Until Park's announcement of March 1963 that military rule might be
extended, the U.S. was constrained by the fear that Kim Jong Pil and the younger
colonels would gain in power. In January 1963, the embassy went so far as to
argue that the military's, and Park's, complete withdrawal from politics was nei-
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ther "feasible nor desirable" (U.S. Embassy, 1%3a).
A badly bungled currency conversion plan in June 1962, revelations of corrup-
tion and KCIA malfeasance, and the inflationary consequences of the military's
economic policies gradually moved the United States AID mission to adopt a tougher
position on economic reform. In March 1963, AID officials overseeing the Far East
in Washington noted that it had been almost a year since supporting assistance to
Korea had been released. When this was investigated, it was found that the direc-
tor of the AID mission had been withholding portions of U.S. aid, including PLA80
assistance, with the purpose of forcing the Korean government to adopt a stabiliza-
tion plan (U.S. Embassy, 1963b). This pressure came at a decisive moment of
particularly poor harvests in the fall of 1962 and the spring of 1963. The expecta-
tion of devaluation and rumors of a U.S. aid cutoff encouraged hoarding and specu-
lation, pushing grain prices up dramatically and worsening the usual "spring
famine."
The need to generate foreign exchange pushed the military government to
several innovations in support of exDorters, including new financing schemes, tax
exemptions and a system that linked the right to import to export proceeds (Hong,
1979:54-55). Park also attempted to get around AID and maintain the elements of
his politically motivated economic policies by obtaining private foreign commercial
credits, not only from the United States, but from Germany, Italy, France and
Canada as well (Far Eastern Economic Review, August 8, 1965). Nonetheless,
foreign exchange reserves dropped from $193 million in June 1962 to under $100
million in July 1963 as foreign exchange was used to import rice.
The pressures exerted on the economic front by the U.S. came to overlap with
growing concern in Washington about the country's political direction. Park's
announcement in March that military rule might be extended was met by an extreme-
ly tough American response. Kennedy sent a personal note of protest to the junta
and the State Department announced that $25 million in economic aid to assist the
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Five Year Plan was being withhc'd.
The United States pressure appeared to work on both fronts. Park agreed to
elections in the fall as well as to a stabilization plan. Four year-end targets were
set: ceilings on the money supply, budget deficit, and commercial bank credit and a
floor on foreign exchange reserves. The object of the stabilization plan was to get
the Korean government to "adopt basically new fiscal and foreign exchange policies
in order to meet program goals" (U.S. Embassy, 1963c). The embassy recognized
that the two objectives of seeuring a return to democratic ride and achieving stabi-
lization clashed, since the range of policy actions required by the stabilization
program would be highly unpopulai: cutting rice subsidies, insisting on repayment
of loans to farmers, and cutting the budget. Some accommodation was made in the
implementation of the plan, but the United States stood firm, fearing that the
government would "react to their plight by putting pressure on the U.S. to provide
more aid" (U.S. Embassy, l%3d).
IV.ECONOMIC POLICY UNDER PARK CHUNG HEE: 1964-1966
The election by no means marked the end of opposition to Park's rule. The
country experienced political crises in 1964 and 1965 over the ratification of the
treaty normalizing political ana economic relations with Japan (Kim, 1971). The
seriousness of the Treaty Crisis should not be downplayed. In using martial law to
manage protest, the crisis demonstrated the veto that the military continued to hold
over political life. Nonetheless, Park's victory in the 1963 election did free the
government to concentrate its efforts more squarely on economic policy reforms;
devaluation, tax and interest rate reforms, an opening to foreign capital and the
drive to expand exports. While the ruling party was once again charged with elec-
toral fraud, Park could run in the May 1967 elections on the basis of successful
economic performance.
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American influence was crucial in these reform efforts. Fearing that the
government's efforts would relax, the AID mission gradually shifted the policy
dialogue from the question of stabilization toward the issue of devaluation. Though
some members of the AID team sought a rate of 300 won to the dollar, the U.S.
position was that 285 would be appropriate; over 1963, the rate averaged 130 to the
dollar. The Korean government returned with representatives from business who
said that they could not live with 285 because of the anticipated rise in the cost of
imported inputs. But the United States insisted on a large devaluation, and on May
3, 1964, the official rate was devalued to 255, a fairly revealing ex post indicator
of the relative power positions of the two sides.
Prior to the summer of 1964, the policy dialogue betweer the United States
and Korea centered largely on devaluation and stabilization. In the summer of 1964,
there were important changes in the leadership of both AID and EPB that signaled a
new and more collaborative course. In May, Chang Key Young took over as Deputy
Prime Minister and head of EPB, where he was to stay until 1967. Prior to his
assumption of the position, EPB had seen six changes of leadership in its short
history. Despite its formal powers, its planning efforts had been sidetracked by
larger political conflicts. Chang, while maintaining close contact with Park and the
DRP, was also granted wide leeway in the development and implementation of
economic policy. The new AID chief met on a regular basis with Chang to outline
the details of various reforms, generally getting the support of Chang who would
mobilize the bureaucracy for action.
The new AID team did not openly abandon the money supply targets of the
1964 stabilization program on the grounds that to do so would lessen U.S. bargaining
power (Bernstein, 1966). In 1964, however, AID signaled that they would take a
more lenient view of plan targets than the previous team had. The new team, and
particularly advisor David (Cole, believed that it was counterproductive to push strict
monetary targets while simultaneously undertaking difficult reforms of the fiscal
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and financial systems. The issue was not getting the prices "right," but providing
additional incentives that give the economy a push: the exchange rate low, credit to
productive activities and exports cheap, and interest rates to savers high. The
inflationary consequences of such a policy course would be partly offset by the
mobilization of new resources, but some inflation was seen as tolerable.
The reforms not directly related to the push to expand exports can be re-
viewed here only briefly. The improvement in tax collection is a clear example of
the link between administrative reform and the extractive capability of the state.
Since the early fifties, the AID mission had financed a succession of advisers on
all aspects of the tax system, but tax collection remained poor. In March 1966,
under the direction of a close military associate of Park Chung Hee's, a sweeping
reorganization of the Taxation Bureau was launched. Tax collections increase
18.6% in 1964, 44.5% in 1965 and 68.7% in 1966 with little change in the tax struc-
ture or rates (Landers, 1967:133).
A concern with domestic resource mobilization was also behind the interest
rate reform of late 1965 (Cole and Park, 1983; McKinnon, 1973). Studies commis-
sioned by the U.S. pointed to the negative effects of low interest rate ceilings on
domestic savings, but a particular concern of the government was the rapid growth
of the financial power of the curb market, which accounted for between 56 and 63
percent of total domestic credit at the end of 1964. A major incentive to reform
was to move savings into the state-owned banking system. Park pushed a doubling
of interest rate ceilings through the National Assembly in September 1965 with U.S.
prodding (Cole and Park, 1983:163-165).
The defining aspect of the new course was the single-minded emphasis placed
on exports. The neoclassical interpretation of the success of this effort was that
it hinged on devaluation and the selective liberalization of imports. The organiza-
tional context of Korea's export promotion efforts receives much less attention, but
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was important in three ways. First, institutional design cut across normal bureau-
cratic lines by engaging the power of the president and AID. This gave the export
drive its comprehensive character. Second, the new institutions linked the public
and private sectors and prcvided channels for the exchange of information between
them. This structure enhanced the credibility of policy by engaging the private
sector in its formulation. At the same time, however, the development of extensive
informational capabilities and expertise within the bureaucracy allowed the govern-
ment to monitor the private sector and to use discretionary policy instruments, such
as tax audits, to guarantee compliance, in some cases, down to the level of the
firm. Finally, the new institutions disseminated technical and market information
that was critical for establishing effective market links between Korea and the
rest of the world.
In late 1964, while AID was absorbed with developing a new stabilization pro-
gram for 1965, a program for export expansion was being formulated within the
Ministry of Commerre and Industry with the assistance of Amicus Most, an Ameri-
can businessman who had been hired as an adviser to AID (Most, 1969). In March
1965, an Export Promotion Subcommittee (EPSC) was formed, which while not a
government agency, became a central organizational locus for mobilizing support for
expanded exports. The EPSC consisted of the vice-ministers of the economic
ministries and relevant agencies, governors and officials of the Bank of Korea and
the commercial banks and representatives from private sector peak associations:
the Korean Chambers of Commerce, the Korean Businessmans Association, the
Korean Traders Association, aiid the Small and Medium Business Cooperatives
Association. At the working level, the EPSC consisted of a series of private-
public task forces assigned to examine problems of finance and taxation, agricul-
ture, fishing, mining, heavy industry, light industry, marketing, information, quality
improvement and technical assistance. Through the task forces, the EPSC influ-
enced the annual export promotion policy proposals emanating from the Ministry of
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Commerce and Industry.
Despite the fact that the most important price incentives--the exchange rate,
export credit and access to imports--were extended on a non-discretionary basis, an
interesting feature of the export promotion effort was its sectoral emphasis.
Through the Ministries of Commerce and Industry and Agriculture and Forestry, 35
"commodity chiefs" were assigned to develop programs for specific commodities
and to coordinate with representatives of the appropriate industry. Organized under
the Korean Traders Association, sectoral export organizatio is provided services
such as marketing, advertising, inspection and arbitration assistance, and were
provided various special favors, such as the right to allocate quotas (as in the
textile industry) among member firms. Priority sectors were not rigidly set; the
export promotion structure was flexible and responsive to business requests for
priority status. Nonetheless, there were various criteria that were established for
inclusion, such as a preference for new export activities over existing ones and the
avoidance of those low-cost, mass-produced items amenable to automated production
in the advanced industrial states.
The sectoral focus of the program is clear in the setting of export targets, by
region, industry and in some cases, by individual firms. At the beginning of the
export drive, targets were command in nature with sanctions used to gain compli-
ance. Gradually, the target setting exercise became a way to identify policy barri-
ers to expanded exports and the firms began to set their own targets. The gov-
ermnent role included aggregating and processing information supplied through the
export associations. But the targets were more than just projections. A survey of
firms by Rhee, Ross-Larson and Ptursell (1984) reveals that the firms felt that the
target-setting process had resulted in a more rapid expansion of production than
they would have otherwise undertaken. Half of the firms surveyed for 1974 and
1975 claimed this, and three-fifths of the firms in 1976. The surveys also reveal
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that the government maintained mechanisms for guaranteeing compliance. Only one
firm claimed that it had been penalized for failing to meet an export target. Of 85
firms polled, however, 58 mentioned that the rigor of tax collection was linked to
export performance while another 38 mentioned that export performance was tied to
greater facility and speed in their dealings with government. Sixty-one of 85
ranked "assurance of continued government support for the firm's efforts" as an
advantage of good export performance.
The formation of the EPSC and the setting of annual targets provided institu-
tional mechanisms through which the public and private sector were brought together
and mutual influence was exercised. What is particularly interesting about the
Korean case is that such efforts extended up to the president himself. In 1%5, the
first National Export Promotion Meeting was held, chaired by the presioent. The
president could act directly on problems that individual industries were facing,
often by simply issuing directives on the spot that had the force of law. The
meetings provided a way of smoothing difficulties they had in dealing with govern-
ment ministries (21 firms out of 51 listed this as a primary benefit of the meet-
ings) and permitting decisions of principle that facilitated exporting (16 of 51 listed
this).
A second set of institutions that evolved during the early sixties were those
concerned with disseminating information and the transfer of what might be called
"managerial technology." Given that Korea did not have an advantage in heavily
automated machine production that would act to ensure quality, quality control
became a crucial issue in establishing a competitive position and a longer-term
reputation (Most, 1%9:82-90). The improvement of quality poses a collective action
dilemma. Any given firm benefits from the efforts of other national firms, but
has an incentive to sacrifice quality for price in markets that are price sensitive.
The government acted in two ways to overcome this dilemma. The first was the
effort to prevent the export of items that did not meet certain standards or con-
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tract specifications; the second was to disseminate internal standards and promote
the sampling techniques that would allow rigorous testing. Over the early sixties,
a network of public quality control organizations were developed.
A greater problem was to meet the design requirements for standardized
mass-marketed products typical of advanced country markets. The most obvious
channel for marketing Korea's exports were .jose large retail chains (in the U.S.)
and trading companies (in Japan) willing to take a developmental approach to their
relations with Korean firms. The problem, however, was in generating the initial
interest, since information is scarce on a potential producer entering world markets
for the first time, and reputation is non-existent. Korean firms with historical
ties with Japan were important in the opening of economic relations with that
country, but the government played a large role in making new markets where such
connections did not exist. A key recommendation of the EPSC was that an effort
be made to induce the executives of leading U.S. chains to come to Korea. In
Most's (1969:118) words, "through the U.S. government agencies, the door was
opened to meet the top executives of the buying chains." In October 1965, represen-
tatives of ten of the largest American buying chains doing a total of $15 billion of
retail business annually were invited to Seoul.
Establishing the marketing nexus worked both ways. Not only did foreign
firms have to discover Korea, it was imperative for Korea to establish permanent
presence in foreign capitals. In part, this was a foreign policy problem, and new
efforts were made to broaden the scope of Korea's foreign relations. The Korean
Trade Promotion Corporation (KOTRA), modeled on Japan's JETRO, was founded
as a public entity in 1962. KOTRA was the overseas arm of the Ministry of
Commerce and Industry and functioned as commercial attaches of embassies normal-
ly do. KOTRA assisted manufacturers in locating markets, advised on market
requirements and served as a conduit for information between Korean producers,
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traders and foreign buyers.
The various economic incentives extended to exporters--fis.al incentives,
wastage allowances, etc.--have been listed elsewhere, and need not be discussed
here in detail (Hong, 1979). Two policies are worth reviewing, however, because
they suggest the curious mix of mercantalism and liberalism in the Korean export
program. Probably the most important way in which the government enhanced the
profitability of exporting was through its control of credit (Cole and Park, 1983:ch.
6; Hong and Park, 1986). Short-term, low-interest loans were extended without
limit against any letter of credit (L/C). L/C loans' were made at 6 1/2%, com-
pared with discounts on commercial bills that were 24% following the interest rate
reform. The cost of the interest rate subsidy was born by the Central Bank,
which discounted the loans by the commercial banks. Since this was a source of
guaranteed profit, the commercial banks had an interest in seeking export business.
The rediscounting was covered partially out of other profits of the Central Bank
and partly by direct subsidies from the government. Such a program, devised by
the industry-oriented Ministry of Commerce and Industry, naturally cut against the
emphasis on stabilization that had characterized American aid policy in 1963 and
1964. Nonetheless, it was sold by the AID mission, even over reservations of the
conservative Ministry of Finance!
The role of trade liberalization in Korea's export growth is a matter of
substantial debate. Frank, Kim and Westphal (1975) and Krueger (1979) argue that
the sixties was a decade of liberalization, basing their judgement on the 1964-66
period on an increase in the number of items eligible for import and a decline in
the number of prohibited items. They also note, however, that after the 1964
devaluation, a temporary special tariff law was enacted to capture windfalls on
restricted import items, with tariffs up to 90% being applied, and that an import
prepayment deposit was frequently required of 100% of import value. Even after
196) a number of policies continued to affect the ability to import, including the
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obligation to surrender foreign exchange in exchange for certificates, advance
deposit requirements, the licensing of traders and minimum export requirements for
importers.
Import quotas on individual items were abolished only at the end of 1966.
Though this is taken as evidence of the abandonment of discretionary quantitative
restrictions and greater reliance on tariffs, the QRs were replaced by a system
under which items could only be imported by manufacturers of related products a
policy with obvious protectionist implications. The policy of linking importation of
some items to the export of similar products created a kind of industry-specific
'barter' system whereby privileges on the domestic market were granted in relation
to export performance.
Perhaps the most important change in trade policy is held to be the switch
from a positive to a negative list system, a change in policy, which, as with the
unlimited discounting of loans against confirmed letters of credit, reduced the
degree of government discretion over the behavior of importers. This reform did
not come until July 1967, however, and even then, the new system restricted 42.9%o
of all import categories. Gilbert Brown, a champion of the neoclassical interpreta-
tion of Korea's takeoff, states bluntly that "no major industries were left without
either quantitative restrictions or tariff protection adequate to maintain strong
domestic market positions" (Brown,1973:167; Hong, 1979:107).
In sum, the development of Korea's export capacity followed the following
policy sequence. First, stabilization allowed a significant devaluation. Shortly
thereafter, a wide-ranging program of subsidies and supports to exporters was also
launched designed to enhance the profitability of the export sector. This effort
went beyond price incentives, however, to the development of political and adminis-
trative structures that allowed private sector input and enhanced the state's capacity
to monitor performance. Additional government efforts centered on establishing
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market connections between Korea and the outside world by providing information.
Liberalization, however, was extremely selective, leaving the domestic market for
consumer goods in the hands of local firms.
V. CONCLUSION
In the late 1970s, Korea's economic policy turned in an even more interventionist
direction in an effort to develop heavy and chemical industries (Haggard and Moon
1983; Haggard, 1990:ch. 6). The level of industrial concentration increased dramat-
ically, and an even closer relationship developed between the government and the
largest chaebol. It is a telling commentary on the neoclassical interpretation of
Korea's growth that not until the government of Chun Doo Hwan in the 1980s were
a number of important reforms even contemplated: comprehensive import liberali-
zation, privatization, liberalization and internationalization of the financial sector
and a gradual retreat from the subsidization of exports and the industrial targeting
that characterized Korea's growth (Moon 1988; Haggard and Moon 1990).
Does Korea offer other developing countries a "model," or are historical
peculiarities of the case barriers to drawing any policy inferences or broader
generalizations? Some conclusions can be drawn concerning the role of outside
pressure in policy reform, the importance of administrative capacity and organiza-
tion and finally, on the politics of policy change.
The Korean case suggests strongly that the power of outside actors is limited
by the internal political situation. Even with Korea's overwhelming dependence on
the United States, Rhee was successfully able to resist unwanted reforms. Park,
on the other hand, was more politically vulnerable to U.S. pressure. But the suc-
cess of U.S. influence did not simply rest on the manipulation of aid to achieve
desired ends. Two additional ingredients were required. First, the reforms
promised to address political problems that Park faced. Economic reforms prom-
ised to mobilize foreign exchange and savings and had tangible benefits for the
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party in power. Second, the sustainability of the reforms rested not simply on
pressure, but on the development of a longer-term cooperative relationship between
American aid advisers and Korean technocrats. These transnational ties not only
served to communicate ideas from the outside, but also sensitized AID advisers to
domestic political constraints.
Second, our account suggests that economic development strategies are not
simply packages of discrete oolicies, but involve the development Of administrative
capacities. Institutional reform had two crucial functions. First, it enhanced the
position of the tee-nocrats within the bureaucracy itself, elevating their status and
increasing their control over the power of other ministries. This enhanced the
capacity of the government to formulate coherent policy. Second, administrative
reforms enhanced the quality of the civil service at lower levels, and thus in-
creased the ability of the government to implement policies.
We have argued that the political networks that sustained Korean ISI were
only broken through the intervention of the military and that the ability to imple-
ment policy swiftly and flexibly "benefited" from the relative weakness of the
legislature and interest groups including business as well as labor. It is an in-
structive counterfactual to think of what Korea's economy would be like if govern-
ments similar to either the Rhee or even Chang Myon governments had stayed in
power. Two generalizations might be offered. First, the timing of political cycles
matters. The period of most active reform came after Park's political position
had been temporarily secured by his election in October 1963. Second, policies are
likely to be more effective if the private sector has channels of access to govern-
ment, but does not dominate the policy process. Some mechanisms of insulation are
required to shield business from its own instinctive tendency to exploit rent-seeking
opportunities.
Our analysis of the Korean case has broader analytical implications for the
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study of economic development in Asia and elsewhere in the developing world. To
date, econiomists have worked in isolation from area and country specialists and
political scientists. Economic models are elaborated with minimal attention to the
institutional framework. Nor is an effort made to understand why policies are
adopted; policy choice is treated as exogenous. On the other hand, regional and
political studies have not explored historical and archival materials with an eye
toward auestions in economTc theory, such as the effect of differer-t growth strate-
gies on economic performance. Focusing on the politics of economic policy reform
and the role of institutions in economic growth constitutes an important bridge
toward truly interdisciplinary work in political eccnomy.
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